🇷🇺 Nuclear Arsenal of Russia

In 2026, Russia has a total of 5459 nuclear warheads, including 1718 deployed. They made 715 tests between 1949 and 1990.

Russia retains the world's largest nuclear arsenal and the most diverse array of delivery systems, spanning a full strategic triad plus an extensive non-strategic arsenal. The expiration of New START on February 5, 2026 — the first time since the early 1970s with no binding limits on U.S.–Russian strategic forces — combined with a revised nuclear doctrine and forward deployment of weapons to Belarus, signals the most coercive Russian nuclear posture since the Cold War.

Russia's military stockpile is assessed at approximately 4,309 warheads: ~1,718 deployed on strategic launchers, ~1,112 in strategic reserve, and ~1,558 non-strategic warheads in central storage. An additional ~1,150 retired warheads await dismantlement, bringing the total inventory to ~5,459. Russia dismantles an estimated 200–300 retired warheads per year.

November 2024 doctrine revision

On November 19, 2024, Russia formally revised its nuclear doctrine — the most significant update since 2020:

• Lowered threshold: Nuclear use now permitted against a "critical threat to sovereignty and/or territorial integrity," down from the previous "threat to the very existence of the state."
• Joint attack clause: Aggression by any non-nuclear state "with the participation or support" of a nuclear state is now treated as a joint attack — enabling nuclear retaliation against the nuclear patron. This provision directly targets Western military aid to Ukraine.
• Belarus umbrella: Russia's nuclear protection now explicitly extends to Belarus as a Union State member.
• Aerospace mass attack: Nuclear response is authorized upon "massive launch of aerospace attack weapons" — including drones and cruise missiles — crossing Russia's border.

Force structure and major vectors

Land (Strategic Rocket Forces)

Russia fields ~300–334 ICBMs:

• RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) — the backbone of the force with ~210 launchers (180 road-mobile, 30+ silo-based), each carrying 4 MIRVed warheads. Approximately 88% of strategic forces now use post-Soviet systems.
• Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1) — ~78 remaining (60 silo, 18 mobile), in final stages of retirement.
• Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle on UR-100N (SS-19) boosters — 12 deployed with the 13th Red Banner Rocket Division at Yasny (two full regiments as of December 2024). Travels at Mach 20+, capable of maneuvering to evade missile defense.
• RS-28 Sarmat — Despite years of claims, Putin admitted on October 29, 2025, that Sarmat is "not yet on combat duty." Only one successful flight test (April 2022); subsequent tests have failed, including a September 2024 failure that destroyed its Plesetsk silo, and a November 2025 failure at Dombarovskiy where the missile crashed seconds after launch. No serial production confirmed.
• SS-18 Voevoda — ~34 aging liquid-fuel ICBMs remain, awaiting replacement by Sarmat.
• Iskander-M (SS-26) — tactical ballistic missile brigades with nuclear option (500 km range).

Sea (Navy)

• 8 Borei/Borei-A SSBNs in service, each carrying 16 RSM-56 Bulava SLBMs: Yury Dolgorukiy, Alexander Nevsky, Vladimir Monomakh (Borei), and Knyaz Vladimir, Knyaz Oleg, Generalissimus Suvorov, Imperator Aleksandr III, and Knyaz Pozharskiy (commissioned July 2025, Borei-A). Two more under construction (Dmitry Donskoy expected 2026, Knyaz Potemkin expected 2028), with a target of 14 boats total.
• 4 Delta IV SSBNs retain R-29RM Sineva/Layner SLBMs (16 per boat, up to 4 MIRVs each). Service life extended to ~2030 with Layner missile upgrades until sufficient Borei-A boats are available.
• Poseidon nuclear-powered autonomous torpedo: first successful test in October 2025. Carrier submarine Belgorod (Project 09852) is operational with 6 Poseidon tubes. Purpose-built carrier Khabarovsk (Project 09851) was launched November 2025 and is expected to enter service by late 2026, with additional carriers planned.

Air (Aerospace Forces)

• Tu-95MS Bear-H (~40 operational) and Tu-160/Tu-160M Blackjack (~15) armed with Kh-102 nuclear cruise missiles. Two newly-built Tu-160M bombers were delivered in December 2025, though production remains slow (~2/year). A June 2025 Ukrainian drone attack (Operation Spiderweb) destroyed 6–7 Tu-95MS at Olenya and other bases — irreplaceable losses since production ended in 1991.
• MiG-31K with nuclear-capable Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile (Mach 10, ~480 km range). Used 25 times in combat in Ukraine through early 2026.

New systems

• Oreshnik IRBM — derived from the RS-26 Rubezh; range 3,000–5,500 km; Mach 10+ terminal velocity; 6 MIRVed warheads. Nuclear-capable. First combat use against Dnipro, Ukraine on November 21, 2024; second use against Lviv region on January 9, 2026. Entered production in 2025; a dedicated brigade was formed December 2025. An Oreshnik battalion began combat duty in Belarus on December 30, 2025.
• Burevestnik (SSC-X-9 Skyfall) nuclear-powered cruise missile — Russia claimed a successful 14,000 km test in October 2025. Not independently verified. Deployment not expected before 2027.
• Tsirkon (Zircon) hypersonic missile — officially accepted into service in early 2025. Mach 9, ~1,000 km range. Nuclear-capable. Deployed on surface ships and being integrated on Yasen-M submarines.

Tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus

Belarus hosts "several dozen" Russian nuclear warheads, stored in a purpose-built facility completed in 2023. Delivery systems include Belarusian Su-25 aircraft and Russian Iskander-M launchers. An Oreshnik battalion began combat duty in Belarus in December 2025. All warheads remain under Russian operational control. Belarusian forces practiced tactical nuclear weapon launch procedures during the Zapad 2025 exercise.

Outlook

With New START expired and no follow-on negotiations in sight, Russia faces no external constraints on its deployed warhead numbers and could theoretically upload hundreds of additional warheads onto existing ICBMs and SLBMs. Moscow has stated it will "act responsibly" but considers itself no longer bound by treaty limits. The Sarmat program's continued failures represent the most significant shortfall in Russia's modernization plans, leaving Avangard stranded on aging UR-100N boosters. However, the Oreshnik's rapid fielding and deployment to Belarus introduces a new class of intermediate-range nuclear-capable weapon not seen in Europe since the INF Treaty era. Putin ordered preparations for a possible resumption of nuclear testing at Novaya Zemlya in November 2025, though satellite imagery shows only preliminary activity. The Doomsday Clock was moved to 85 seconds to midnight in January 2026 — the closest ever — driven in part by Russian nuclear risks.

Sources

• Wikipedia
• Federation of American Scientists
• Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists